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I. ON PATTERNS AND LIMITED PROGRESS
Twentieth-century American legal history is notable for a series of
equal-rights struggles and partial, majestic triumphs. Since the 1950s,
activists have insisted that the nation confront its formal policies of
white supremacy and their legacies.1 Since the 1960s, women have
demanded an end to unequal protection before the law and broader
rights to control their bodies and the social, economic, and political con-
ditions of their lives.2 And, since the 1970s, equality advocates have
t Bryan K. Fair is the Thomas E. Skinner Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Special
Programs at the University of Alabama School of Law, where he teaches Constitutional Law, the
First Amendment, and related classes. He is the author of Notes of a Racial Caste Baby:
Colorblindness and the End of Affirmative Action and numerous articles on caste in the United
States. Professor Fair wishcs to thank his colleagues for their support over the years, Dean
Kenneth Randall for his visionary leadership of the University of Alabama School of Law, and he
is especially grateful to Katie Pope, Mark Libell, Oscar Price, and Jack Bethay for their excellent
research assistance during the development of this project. All rights reserved.
1. See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, at xi-xii (1987); DERRICK BELL, RACE,
RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 654-56 (4th ed. 2000); BRYAN K. FAIR, NOTES OF A RACIAL CASTE
BABY: COLORBLINDNESS AND THE END OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 105-09 (1997); JUAN F. PEREA
ET AL., RACE AND RACES 168-71 (2d ed. 2007).
2. Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1177
(1988) ("Between the mid 1960s and '70s, women's rights and women's liberation organizations
became an increasingly visible presence on the cultural landscape, and offered a growing
challenge to traditional gender patterns."); see also LAURA A. OTrEN, WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND THE
LAW 80-86 (1993) (discussing the legal shift for women's rights); STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN ET
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compelled Congress and the federal courts to address their disabled cli-
ents' inferior status under the law.3 Although each of these landmark
battles endures, with much work yet to be done to eliminate cumulative
privilege for some Americans and cumulative disadvantage for others,
those unfinished revolutions will likely await the resolution of the battle
over the civil rights of American citizens who are also gay' individuals
or couples.5 And at stake is more than simply a license to marry. Like its
predecessors, this epic battle is about again asserting the constitutional
entitlement to equal dignity of all American citizens.
A. Jim Crow's Other Cousin
Much like Charlie Houston saw public schools as the best place to
combat racial discrimination in public life,6 new equality advocates have
emerged to frame the legal assault on another Jim Crow cousin-dis-
crimination against American citizens who are also gay-in the context
of the fundamental right to marry.7 Yet, the end they seek is nondiscrim-
ination in all aspects of their lives. They seek to vindicate the American
AL., PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 25-26 (1996)
(discussing the difficulties women and feminism encountered in the workplace).
3. See, e.g., Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (2000); Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000); Michael Ashley Stein & Penelope J.S. Stein,
Beyond Disability Civil Rights, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1203, 1207-08 (2007).
4. Throughout this article, I use the term "gay" to refer to the community of American
citizens who are gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgendered. I do so only for convenience and not to
diminish the unique concerns of individuals or groups.
5. See generally DONALD J. CANTOR ET AL., SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE LEGAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVOLUTION IN AMERICA (2006) (discussing case law concerning gay marriage,
research on gay families, and the law of adoption); JONATHAN GOLDBERG-HILLER, THE LIMITS TO
UNION: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE POLITICS OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2002) (arguing that the same-
sex-marriage controversy is a response to anxieties over the fragmented nature of community);
KATHLEEN E. HULL, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF LOVE AND LAW (2006)
(examining same-sex marriages in the contemporary United States); DAVID MOATS, CIVIL WARS:
A BATTLE FOR GAY MARRIAGE (2004) (explaining the civil-union political debate in Vermont);
RICHARD D. MOHR, THE LONG ARC OF JUSTICE: LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE, EQUALITY, AND
RIGHTS (2005) (employing the philosophy of "applied ethics" to the same-sex-marriage
discussion); DANIEL R. PINELLO, AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2006)
(describing how courts, politicians, and activists deal with the same-sex-marriage issue);
JONATHAN RAUCH, GAY MARRIAGE: WHY IT Is GOOD FOR GAYS, GOOD FOR STRAIGHTS, AND
GOOD FOR AMERICA (2004) (arguing same-sex marriages would benefit everyone); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419 (1993) (recounting the
history of same-sex marriage).
6. GENNA RAE McNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 116 (1983).
7. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE: FOR BETTER OR FOR
WORSE? 14-17 (2006); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY,
GENDER, AND THE LAW 795-822 (1997) (describing the same-sex-marriage debate); Kenneth L.
Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 627 (1980) (noting that marriage
is a fundamental freedom).
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Promise of liberty and equality, a guarantee of equal status in relation to
the state. And judges throughout the country have been listening.
Consider the recent holding of the California Supreme Court in In
re Marriage Cases:
[W]e conclude that, under this state's Constitution, the constitution-
ally based right to marry properly must be understood to encompass
the core set of basic substantive legal rights and attributes tradition-
ally associated with marriage that are so integral to an individual's
liberty and personal autonomy that they may not be eliminated or
abrogated by the Legislature or by the electorate through the statutory
initiative process. These core substantive rights include, most funda-
mentally, the opportunity of an individual to establish-with the per-
son with whom the individual has chosen to share his or her life-an
officially recognized and protected family possessing mutual rights
and responsibilities and entitled to the same respect and dignity
accorded a union traditionally designated as marriage.8
The Connecticut Supreme Court has reached the same conclusion,
ruling that same-sex couples must have the same rights to marry as
different-sex couples, nothing less. In his majority opinion, Justice Rich-
ard Palmer wrote that "segregation of heterosexual and homosexual
couples into separate institutions constitutes a cognizable harm" since
"the institution of marriage carries with it a status and significance that
the newly created classification of civil unions does not embody."9 The
import of this language is that gays are entitled to equality in marriage
and other aspects of their lives as a matter of state constitutional law.
These conclusions closely parallel what Justice Kennedy wrote
about the federal constitution in Lawrence v. Texas:
"These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to per-
sonal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right
to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under compulsion of the State."
Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for
these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.'0
8. 183 P.3d 384, 399 (Cal. 2008).
9. Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, No. SC 17716, 2008 Conn. LEXIS 385, at *4 (Conn.
Oct. 28, 2008).
10. 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (citation omitted) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
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They also call to mind Justice Douglas' admonition in Griswold v. Con-
necticut that
[m]arriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an associa-
tion that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not
political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.
Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our
prior decisions."
Finally, in Loving v. Virginia, Chief Justice Warren reminded the nation
that
[m]arriage is one of the "basic civil rights of man," fundamental to
our very existence and survival. . . . The Fourteenth Amendment
requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by
invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom
to marry or not marry, a person of another race resides with the indi-
vidual and cannot be infringed by the State.'"
Taken together, these federal constitutional decisions make it seem
universally accepted that burdens on the right to marry implicate the
most exacting review by the Court, rendering most restrictions presump-
tively unconstitutional. Nonetheless, most states currently limit marriage
to opposite-sex couples. Only two states, Massachusetts and Connecti-
cut, recognize same-sex marriage. Several others provide same-sex
couples comparable rights through domestic-partnership or civil-union
statutes and procedures.' 3 It is unclear if the principle of separate but
equal has any currency regarding the civil rights of gays, even after its
complete repudiation in earlier civil-rights battles.
B. Is Equality Still an Empty Idea?
The legal issues in this latest equal-rights battle are as diverse,
dynamic, and important as the people of the whole country.' 4 Can gov-
ernment prevent gay citizens from enjoying any fundamental rights,
such as the right to marry, to adopt children, and to direct the upbringing
of children? Does the fundamental right to privacy, so carefully eluci-
dated in Lawrence v. Texas, provide full and equal rights to gay citizens
in matters as personal as with whom they wish to join their lives, for
better or worse?' 5 Is marriage the ultimate intimate association and, like
11. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
12. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
13. See Misha Isaak, Comment, "What's in a Name?": Civil Unions and the Constitutional
Significance of "Marriage," 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 607, 608 nn.7 & 9 (2008).
14. See discussion infra Part II.
15. See Karst, supra note 7, at 634; Nancy Catherine Marcus, The Freedom of Intimate
Association in the Twenty First Century, 16 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 269, 305-06 (2006);
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family, protected against arbitrary governmental interference by the First
Amendment's fundamental right to associate, as well as the Fourteenth
Amendment's right to privacy? Is sexual orientation a permissible basis
for distinguishing the rights of American citizens in marriage and family
disputes, such as the awarding of custody? Are American citizens who
are also gay America's Untouchables, subject to special legislation rele-
gating them to permanent disadvantage and second-caste status? 6 Is pri-
vate prejudice or animus towards gay citizens a legitimate basis for
legislative classifications? And, if gay citizens can be subjects of dis-
crimination in these areas of fundamental rights, what about others?
Legal commentators have begun to map the broad contours of the
debate over same-sex marriage and the rights of gay and lesbian Ameri-
cans. Professor Ken Karst was the first commentator to articulate a the-
ory of constitutional privacy linking same-sex marriage and what he
described as the freedom of intimate association. 7 Since then, other the-
orists have argued in favor of constitutional protection on a synthesis of
due-process and equal-protection grounds, relying on Justice Anthony
Kennedy's opinions in Romer v. Evans'8 and Lawrence, 9 and the
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey2" opinion.
Others have advanced arguments for excluding gays from marriage, and
for leaving the debate to the states.2 ' Very few commentators have con-
sidered freedom of association as an independent constitutional source
for protection of same-sex marriage.22 Even fewer scholars have
examined the fundamental rights to marriage, privacy, and association in
tandem, examining the basic question of whether gay Americans enjoy
all of these fundamental rights to the same extent as Americans who are
Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Right of Privacy in State Constitutional Law, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 971,
1033-34 (2006); Collin O'Connor Udell, Intimate Association: Resurrecting a Hybrid Right, 7
TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 231, 250-54 (1998).
16. Cf Global Caste Discrimination, HUMAN RTS. NEWS, Aug. 29, 2001, http://hrw.org/
english/docs/2001/08/29/globaI1815.htm (discussing caste systems); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
CAS= DISCRIMINATION (2001), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/globalcaste (same).
17. See Karst, supra note 7, at 626-47.
18. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
19. See, e.g., Sharon E. Rush, Whither Sexual Orientation Analysis?: The Proper
Methodology when Due Process and Equal Protection Intersect, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
685, 685, 723-42 (2008).
20. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
21. See, e.g., Robert P. George, Judicial Usurpation and Sexual Liberation: Courts and the
Abolition of Marriage, 17 REGENT U. L. REv. 21, 28-30 (2004).
22. See Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect
Classification, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1285, 1292 n.43 (1985) ("The Supreme Court, by dividing
association into the two components of intimate and expressive association, has in effect
subsumed the right to association into the rights of privacy and expression. Consequently, no
independent basis for gay rights has been developed under the rubric of freedom of association."
(citations omitted)).
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not gay. 3 This Article seeks to begin to fill that void.
C. Does Wait Really Mean Never?
The purpose of this Article is to examine the legal foundations for
this next epic equal-rights struggle and to explain why its outcome, the
legal equality and equal dignity of American citizens who are also gay,
appears all but a certainty given the Court's recent substantive due pro-
cess and equality jurisprudence, especially its decisions regarding the
right to marry, the right to privacy, and the freedom of intimate associa-
tion. My thesis is simple; there is no coherent fundamental-rights theory
to justify rights discrimination against American citizens who are gay,
whether the relevant right is voting or marriage.
In Part II, I critique the coordinated assault on the presumptive
rights of American citizens who are also gay, especially the right to
marry, through legislative acts, referenda, and judicial decisions outside
of the Supreme Court. In Part III, I describe the current legal landscape
of the rights of American citizens who are also gay, in light of recent
Supreme Court decisions. In Part IV, I isolate the fundamental right to
freedom of intimate association, asserting that when this right is linked
with the fundamental rights to privacy, marriage, and equality, these
fundamental norms work together to protect consenting adults' choices
about matters of marriage. In Part V, I conclude by explaining why Law-
rence v. Texas only makes sense if it is given this broad meaning and
with a word of caution and a word of criticism.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to address directly the federal con-
stitutional status of same-sex marriage. The closest the issue has come to
the Court was in the case of Baker v. Nelson. 4 In Baker, Richard Baker
and James McConnell brought suit after they were denied a marriage
license by a county clerk.2 5 The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that
limiting marriage to heterosexuals did not violate either state or federal
constitutional rights, including the Ninth Amendment or the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses. 6 The Supreme
Court dismissed the appeal for lack of a substantial federal question.2"
23. But see, e.g., Udell, supra note 15, at 270-71.
24. 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
25. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 185 (Minn. 1971).
26. Id. at 186-87; see also Nancy K. Kubasek et al., Civil Union Statutes: A Shortcut to Legal
Equality for Same-Sex Partners in a Landscape Littered with Defense of Marriage Acts, 15 U.
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 229, 244 (2004) ("[T]he Baker court denied all of the constitutional
arguments, some without discussion.").
27. Baker, 409 U.S. at 810.
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Since then, the Supreme Court has held in 1975 that a summary
dismissal for want of a federal question is a decision on the merits, and
binding in later cases.28 Because of this principle, some lower courts
have treated the Baker decision as binding and used the state court's
holding to strike down claims for gays.2 9
Other state courts have more recently struck down restrictions on
same-sex marriage as inconsistent with their state constitutions. The first
was Hawaii in Baehr v. Lewin.3 ° In Baehr, the Hawaii Supreme Court
ruled that sex was a suspect category for equal-protection analysis under
the State's Constitution, and that Hawaii's law restricting marriage to
between a man and a woman was presumed to be unconstitutional under
equal-protection analysis.3 The issue became moot there, however,
when Hawaii amended its constitution to define marriage as only
between a man and a woman.32 The Hawaii experience created alarm
among social conservatives around the country that state courts might
expand marriage rights. 33 Massachusetts has also recognized constitu-
tional protection for same-sex marriage rights.3 4 And most recently, Cal-
ifornia and Connecticut courts have held that restrictions on same-sex
marriage are unconstitutional under state law.35
Notwithstanding claims by some that these isolated examples por-
tend a major shift by states, courts have not been particularly active in
striking down legislation that treats same-sex marriage differently than
opposite-sex marriage. Examples of legislation that has been upheld as
constitutional by the nation's lower courts include the military's "don't
ask, don't tell policy," 36 a Florida law banning gays from adopting chil-
dren,37 and an Alabama decision disparaging the custodial rights of a
28. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1975); see also In re Estate of Cooper, 564
N.Y.S.2d 684, 686 (Sur. Ct. 1990) ("The appeal [in Baker] from the Minnesota Supreme Court to
the United States Supreme Court was dismissed for want of a substantial Federal question. Such a
dismissal is a holding that the constitutional challenge was considered and rejected." (citation
omitted)), affid, 597 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App. Div. 1993).
29. See, e.g., McConnell v. Nooner, 547 F.2d 54, 56 (8th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
30. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
31. Id. at 67.
32. E.g., Victor C. Romero, The Selective Deportation of Same-Gender Partners: In Search
of the "Rara Avis," 56 U. MIAMI L. REv. 537, 542 n.32 (2002); cf. Brad K. Gushiken, Comment,
The Fine Line Between Love and the Law: Hawai'i's Attempt To Resolve the Same-Sex Marriage
Issue, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 149, 166 (2000) (noting a constitutional amendment's ability to moot
the point).
33. See Gushiken, supra note 32, at 162-63.
34. See Same Sex Marriage, Civil Unions and Domestic Partnerships, NAT'L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES, May 2008, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/samesex.htm.
35. See id.
36. See Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997).
37. See Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1385 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
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mother who had chosen a same-sex partner.38 And each year, the list of
states with restrictions on same-sex marriage expands. In the end, the
state and federal courts will follow the U.S. Supreme Court, and an
opinion from the Court granting gays protected status as a suspect class
or recognizing a constitutional right to same-sex marriage is the best
hope to ensure the broadest protection of fundamental rights.3 9
A. The Power To Define Who Can Marry
1. CONGRESS
A new impediment to protection of same-sex marriage arose when
Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).4 ° DOMA was
Congress's reaction to fears that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of
Article 4, Section 1 of the Constitution would require states to recognize
same-sex marriages performed in other states where the unions were not
prohibited.41 This argument seems implausible if not irrational. First,
"[tihe Full Faith and Credit Clause has rarely been used by courts to
validate marriages because marriages are not [considered] 'legal judg-
ments."' 42 Section 283 of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws
provides the following:
(1) The validity of a marriage will be determined by the local law of
the state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most sig-
nificant relationship to the spouses and the marriage under the princi-
ples stated in § 6.
(2) A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where
the marriage was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid
unless it violates the strong public policy of another state which had
the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at
the time of the marriage.43
The real purpose for DOMA is apparent considering its text:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and
agencies of the United States, the word "marriage" means only a
legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife,
38. See Ex parte H.H., 830 So. 2d 21, 26, 31 (Ala. 2002) (Moore, C.J., concurring).
39. But see Charles E. Mauney, Jr., Comment, Landmark Decision or Limited Precedent:
Does Lawrence v. Texas Require Recognition of a Fundamental Right to Same-Sex Marriage?, 35
CUMB. L. Rav. 147, 173 (2005).
40. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1
U.S.C. § 7 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000)).
41. See Gushiken, supra note 32, at 162-63.
42. ALISON M. SMITH, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: LEGAL IssuEs 6 (Cong. Research Serv., Order
Code RL31994, 2005), available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-
8030.
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLiCT OF LAWS § 283 (1971).
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and the word "spouse" refers only to a person of the opposite sex
who is a husband or a wife.44
A constitutional challenge to DOMA has yet to reach the Supreme
Court.
2. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE PROSCRIPTIONS AND THE STATES
Forty-four states currently have either a Defense of Marriage Act
statute, state constitutional amendment, or some other legislation prohib-
iting same-sex marriage.45 Recent decisions by courts in New Jersey and
New York, have affirmed prohibitions on same-sex marriages. 46 The
volume of legislation at the state level prohibiting same-sex marriage
would seem to indicate that most Americans are vehemently opposed to
same-sex marriage: State constitutional amendments prohibiting these
marriages have passed in most jurisdictions by overwhelming margins
since 2004. 47
Though a majority of states currently prohibit same-sex marriage
and explicitly define marriage as between a man and a woman,48 there
have been a handful of recent decisions that have gone the other way. In
Deane v. Conaway, a Baltimore City Circuit Court struck down Mary-
land's ban on same-sex marriage as an unconstitutional violation of the
State's equal-rights amendment, as well as its due-process amendment,
44. 1 U.S.C. § 7.
45. Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, and Rhode Island are
the current holdouts, but pressure to enact same-sex-marriage legislation in these states remains
high. See Peter Hay, Recognition of Same-Sex Legal Relationships in the United States, 54 AM. J.
COMP. L. 257, 263-65 (Supp. 2006).
46. See Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 274 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (affirming grant
of summary judgment to defendant state officials where same-sex couples brought action alleging
that refusal to issue them marriage licenses violated their constitutional rights); Hernandez v.
Robles, 805 N.Y.S.2d 354, 377 (App. Div. 2005) (reversing the New York County Supreme
Court's grant of summary judgment to same-sex couples who brought action challenging
constitutionality of Domestic Relations Law provisions that did not permit same-sex marriage).
47. See Kavan Peterson, 50-State Rundown on Gay Marriage Laws, STATELINE.ORG, Nov. 3,
2004, http:/w ww.statelinc.org/ive/'iewPage.action?siteNodeld= 136&languageId= 1 &contentld=
15576.
48. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25; ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.011(a) (2006); ARiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 25-101(C) (2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-104(l)(b) (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 101(a), (d) (2008); FLA. STAT. § 741.04 (2008); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-3-3.1, -3-30(b)(1)
(2004); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 572-1, -1.6, -3 (LexisNexis 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 32-
201, -209 (2006); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/201, /212, /213.1 (West 2008); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 3 1-11-1-1 (West 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-101, -115 (2007); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. arts. 86,
89, 96 (1999 & Supp. 2008); MD. CODE ANN., FAm. LAW § 2-201 (West 2007); MIcH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 551.1-.4 (West 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.01 (West 2006); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 451.022 (West 2003); MoNr. CODE ANN. § 40-1-103 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 457:1-:2 (LexisNexis 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 (2007); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 221
(1993 & Supp. 2005); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-1-10, -15 (Supp. 2007); S.D. CODIFED LAWS § 25-
1-1 (1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-113 (2001); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.001 (Vernon 2006);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2(5) (2007); VA. CODE. ANN. § 20-45.2 (2008).
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because it was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state inter-
est.49 The court found that there was no rational relationship between
protecting the best interests of children and preventing same-sex
marriages.5 °
The most recent decisions striking down a same-sex marriage ban
are from California, as noted earlier, Massachusetts, and Connecticut. In
the Massachusetts State Supreme Court case of Goodridge v. Depart-
ment of Public Health, the court held that the State's equal protection
clause prohibited the legislature from limiting the benefits of marriage to
heterosexual couples .5  The Connecticut Supreme Court has also
recently rejected as unconstitutional the state's civil-union legislation.
Justice Richard N. Palmer wrote that "segregation of heterosexual and
homosexual couples into separate institutions constitutes cognizable
harm. '52 Moreover, Vermont, New Hampshire, and New Jersey have
enacted civil-union statutes that provide essentially the same benefits for
same-sex couples as married couples receive.53
What is most striking to me about the discourse regarding same-sex
marriage is that it seems to rest more on traditional stereotypes rather
than rigorous examination and explanation of why marriage rights
should be denied. Few commentators discuss what marriage is or the
benefits of marriage which are routinely denied same-sex couples. In
one extraordinary book, Richard Mohr's The Long Arc of Justice, the
author seeks to explain philosophically and morally the case for gay
marriage. For Mohr, marriage isn't simply a legal construction, it "is a
mode of daily living, a type of connection between persons, one that
most closely resembles old-fashioned common law marriage."54 Mohr
uses research on gay couples' relationship, including their love, commit-
ment, and intimacy to expand the discourse on what is marriage and to
illustrate that gay couples embrace all of its practical attributes, even
though in so many places they are denied it legal protection and its bene-
fits. And, as Mohr explains, denying marriage rights to gays, denies
them enormous advantages, including tax deductions, credits, and
exemptions; enhanced public assistance; property distribution rights;
inheritance rights; special protection of the law from property attach-
49. No. 24-C-04-005390, 2006 WL 148145, at *1, *3 (Md. Cir. Ct. Jan. 20, 2006), rev'd, 932
A.2d 571 (Md. 2007).
50. Id. at *7.
51. 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003).
52. Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, No. SC 17716, 2008 Conn. LEXIS 385, at *4 (Conn.
Oct. 28, 2008).
53. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 457-A:3 (Westlaw through 2008 Reg. and Spec. Sess.); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 37:1-1 (West 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (2007); id. tit. 18,
§§ 5160-5169.
54. MOHR, supra note 5, at 11.
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ments resulting from a spouse's debts; a right to bring a wrongful-death
suit and a right to receive survivor benefits; and the right to next-of-kin
status at death.55 Thus, in a real sense, denying marriage to same-sex
couples renders those couples second-class citizens.
This legal battle is far from over and it is likely that additional
states will expand restrictions, while others will strike down all marriage
distinctions. Thus, this is an area screaming for constitutional clarity.
The Supreme Court should take its first opportunity to settle the federal
constitutional claims of American citizens who are also gay. They
should not be made to wait for equal justice under law. They should
know whether the federal constitution fully protects them, too, in matters
relating to fundamental rights of privacy, marriage, and association,
among others.
III. THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
OF AMERICAN CITIZENS
Most Americans have an incoherent view of what the Constitution
protects. Former Associate Justice Hugo Black was fond of declaring
that for most Americans, the "Constitution prohibits that which they
think should be prohibited and permits that which they think should be
permitted."56 Fortunately, the Court has not left constitutional interpreta-
tion to the whim of the majority of Americans, especially in matters
relating to family, privacy, and marriage. In these areas, as in so many
others, there is simply no language in the Constitution fixing the right to
marry, freedom of association, the right to privacy, or personal auton-
omy over private choices regarding family or self. Despite this constitu-
tional ambiguity, the Court has unequivocally "derived from the word
liberty a special constitutional protection for privacy, personal auton-
omy, and some family relationships requiring special justification for
state infringements on those interests. 57
A. First Principles and Fundamental Rights
Beginning in the 1920s, and consistently from the 1960s, the Court
has held that the government cannot interfere with matters of family,
marriage, and privacy, absent a compelling reason for doing so, as well
as a showing that the government's regulation was essential to achieve
55. Id. at 63-64.
56. William W. Van Alstyne, Reflections on the Teaching of Constitutional Law, 49 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 653, 658 n.16 (2005).
57. WILLIAM COHEN ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 583 (12th ed.
2005).
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the government's goals.58 In virtually every case presenting such regula-
tions over the past eighty years, the Court has ruled against the govern-
ment. For example, in Meyer v. Nebraska,59 Pierce v. Society of
Sisters,6° Skinner v. Oklahoma,6' Loving v. Virginia,62 Griswold v. Con-
necticut,63 Moore v. City of East Cleveland,64 and Zablocki v. Redhail,
65
the Court rejected each state regulation as inconsistent with the funda-
mental rights of individuals to make personal choices about their lives.
The Supreme Court first maintained that there was a Constitutional
right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut. In Griswold, the appellants
were convicted of violating Connecticut's statute banning contracep-
tives.66 Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, noted while striking down
Connecticut's ban that "the First Amendment has a penumbra where pri-
vacy is protected from governmental intrusion."67 Justice Douglas then
reached the topic of marriage:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older
than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and inti-
mate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes
a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a
bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an asso-
ciation for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions.
68
Since 1965, the Court has carefully explained the nature and scope
of constitutional privacy to include, among other interests, the rights of
married or unmarried adults to use contraception,69 the right to terminate
a pregnancy,7 ° the right to marry,7 1 the right to live with family mem-
58. E.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-88 (1978); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1977) (plurality opinion).
59. 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923).
60. 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
61. 316 U.S. 535, 536-38 (1942).
62. 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967).
63. 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
64. 431 U.S. 494, 505-06 (1977) (plurality opinion).
65. 434 U.S. 374, 377 (1978).
66. 381 U.S. at 480.
67. Id. at 483.
68. Id. at 486 (emphasis added). At least five members of the Court agreed with Justice
Douglas's opinion, although Justices Goldberg, Brennan, and Chief Justice Warren would have
relied more directly on the Ninth Amendment. See id. at 486-87.
69. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
70. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
71. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
12 (1967) ("Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race
resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.").
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bers,7" the rights of expressive or intimate association, 3 and, generally,
the right to avoid the disclosure of certain private matters and the right
to make certain private decisions.74
Reversing the conviction of a parochial-school language teacher
who violated a law forbidding the teaching of any language other than
English in the first eight grades of public or private school, the Court
wrote,
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the lib-
erty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and
some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without
doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also
the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the com-
mon occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to
the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privi-
leges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pur-
suit of happiness by free men.75
Likewise, the Court ruled that Oregon could not, consistent with
the Constitution, compel parents to send their children between the ages
of eight and sixteen to public schools.7 6 Absent some justification for the
loss of such rights, parents and guardians have broad authority to make
private choices about the education and upbringing of children under
their control.77
In Skinner v. Oklahoma, where the Court struck down an Oklahoma
statute that would have provided for mandatory sterilization for certain
habitual criminals, the Court again stressed the importance of marriage
in American society.78 The Court noted that "[m]arriage and procreation
are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."7 9
The Court emphasized the importance of marriage as early as 1888.
In Maynard v. Hill, the Court wrote that marriage is "the most important
relation in life." 0 The Court declared marriage to be a fundamental right
for all citizens in Loving v. Virginia."l In Loving, a Virginia couple con-
victed of violating the State's ban on interracial marriages challenged
the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process
72. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion).
73. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644, 655-56 (2000).
74. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 591, 605 (1977).
75. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
76. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 530, 534-35 (1925).
77. Id. at 535.
78. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
79. Id.
80. 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
81. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
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Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 2 The State argued that, because
whites and blacks were both equally prthibited from interracial mar-
riage, there was no invidious discrimination and thus no equal-protection
violation.83 The state also contended that, if the Equal Protection Clause
does not outlaw miscegenation laws because of their reliance on racial
classifications, the appropriate standard of review was rational basis and
deference goes to the state.84 Chief Justice Warren declared that Vir-
ginia's "equal application" of the law did "not immunize the statute
from the very heavy burden of justification which the Fourteenth
Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes drawn according
to race."85
The Chief Justice went on to hold that the law also violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, writing, "The freedom to
marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essen-
tial to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."86 The Chief Justice
continued, "Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamen-
tal to our very existence and survival."87
In Zablocki v. Redhail, the Court again described the right to marry
as fundamental.88 There, a Wisconsin law was challenged, which
required that a marriage license not be granted unless the applicant
proved that any dependent children not in his care were not likely to
become charges of the state, and that all child support obligations had
been met.89 The plaintiff brought suit challenging the law after being
denied a marriage license because of failure to meet the law's require-
ments.9° The Court struck down the regulation because it violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.91
The Court noted that "the right to marry, establish a home and
bring up children is a central part of the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause.'92 The Court went on to say:
"While the outer limits of [the right of personal privacy] have not
been marked by the Court, it is clear that among the decisions that an
individual may make without unjustified government interference are
82. Id. at 2-3.
83. Id. at 7-8.
84. Id. at 8.
85. Id. at 9.
86. Id. at 12.
87. Id. (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
88. 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978).
89. Id. at 375.
90. Id. at 376.
91. Id. at 377.




personal decisions 'relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, and child rearing and education.' "9
The Zablocki Court also noted that "it would make little sense to recog-
nize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not
with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the founda-
tion of the family in our society."94
The Court did not hold that marriage was without limits, noting that
"reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions
to enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed."95
The Court found that the Wisconsin statute substantially interfered with
the right to marry, because there was a segment of the population that
would forever be barred from marriage, while others might be "coerced"
into avoiding marriage, and even those who could meet the statute's
requirements would "suffer a serious intrusion into their freedom of
choice in an area in which we have held such freedom to be
fundamental.""
The Court reiterated its standard of review for fundamental rights
when it noted that, "[w]hen a statutory classification significantly inter-
feres with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless
it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely
tailored to effectuate only those interests. 97
The right to marry holds up in less traditional circumstances, as was
seen in Turner v. Safley.98 In Turner, the plaintiffs challenged a Missouri
law forbidding inmates to marry without the authorization of the super-
intendent of the prison, and only then when there were compelling rea-
sons to do so.99 The Court described the advantages of marriage, noting
that "inmate marriages, like others, are expressions of emotional support
and public commitment," and that "[t]hese elements are an important
and significant aspect of the marital relationship."'0° The Court noted
that even under a reasonable-relationship test, the marriage regulation
could not survive.' 10
Some lower courts have attacked the idea of same-sex marriage as
a fundamental right and have attempted to limit the extent to which mar-
riage is protected. In Dean v. District of Columbia, the District of
93. Id. at 385 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977)).
94. Id. at 386.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 387.
97. Id. at 388.
98. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
99. Id. at 82.
100. Id. at 95-96.
101. Id. at 97.
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Columbia Court of Appeals upheld a District of Columbia statute
prohibiting the grant of marriage licenses to same-sex couples.10 2 The
concurring Judge Ferren wrote, "[W]e cannot overlook the fact that the
Supreme Court has deemed marriage a fundamental right substantially
because of its relationship to procreation."' 10 3 The court reinforced this
line of reasoning by pointing to language in Skinner"° and Zablocki, °5
where it interpreted the Court as declaring procreation a fundamental
right. 106
The debate over how marriage should be classified is an important
one. Fundamental rights carry with them strict scrutiny, which the gov-
ernment can only overcome by showing that its actions were narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling interest."7 This is usually a monumental
task. It is thus helpful to proponents of same-sex marriage to be able to
invoke marriage as a fundamental right. If they can convince the Court
to look at the issue from this point of view, then a successful ruling is
almost guaranteed.1"8
These cases frame one core aspect of the Court's fundamental-
rights jurisprudence. They provide a set of neutral principles, available
to any American seeking to contest regulatory burdens on their funda-
mental constitutional freedoms. If one assumes, as I do, that these basic
fundamental rights, as declared by the Court, extend to all Americans
under our equality guarantee, then Americans who are gay must, in the
end, enjoy the same fundamental rights.
B. Sexual Orientation and Fundamental Rights
Unfortunately, the Court has a less consistent record describing
how these fundamental-rights norms apply in challenges to regulations
by Americans who are gay. In some cases, it appears some Justices have
been unable to escape general societal prejudice and homophobia.' 09 In
recent ones, the Court implies that Americans who are gay have the
102. 653 A.2d 307, 308 (D.C. 1995) (per curiam).
103. Id. at 333 (Ferren, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
104. See id. ("[M]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of
the race." (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942))).
105. See id. ("It is not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed on the same level
of importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family
relationships." (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978))).
106. Id.
107. E.g., Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388.
108. But see Lynne Marie Kohm, Liberty and Marriage-Baehr and Beyond: Due Process in
1998, 12 BYU J. Pun. L. 253, 274 (1998).
109. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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same fundamental rights as Americans who are not gay or lesbian."'
Consider Bowers v. Hardwick,"' Romer v. Evans," 2 and Lawrence
v. Texas. 1 3 In Bowers, the Court ruled that Georgia's application of its
anti-sodomy laws did not violate the substantive due process rights guar-
anteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." 4 The Supreme Court has not
always applied this privacy right equally to all sexual persuasions. Bow-
ers v. Hardwick marked a low point in the fight for equality for gays. In
Bowers, the Court ruled that Georgia's sodomy statute did not violate
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 5 The Court
noted that there was no privacy right that extended to homosexual sod-
omy."16 In evaluating what was a fundamental liberty, the Court based
its conclusion on "history and tradition.""' 7 The Court left for another
day analysis of Equal Protection Clause and Ninth Amendment
challenges. 1 8
Romer v. Evans marked a turning point for gay and lesbian rights.
At issue in Romer was Amendment 2, an amendment to Colorado's
Constitution that banned laws prohibiting discrimination based on sex-
ual orientation. 19 A number of citizens brought suit challenging the law
as being in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause.1 20 The Court held that under rational-basis equal-protection
analysis, Colorado's amendment was unconstitutional. 12 The Court
wrote that "Amendment 2 .. .in making a general announcement that
gays and lesbians shall not have any particular protections from the law,
inflicts on them immediate, continuing, and real injuries that outrun and
belie any legitimate justifications that may be claimed for it.'
' 22
One can take from Romer the idea that gays and lesbians are sub-
ject to the same treatment as other minority groups. At the conclusion of
its opinion, the Court wrote, "Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not
to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone
else."'123 While this sentence suggests that there can be valid legislation
110. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562, 567.
111. 478 U.S. 186.
112. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
113. 539 U.S. 558.
114. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 189, 196.
115. Id. at 189.
116. Id. at 190-91.
117. Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality
opinion)).
118. Id. at 196 n.8.
119. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623-24 (1996).
120. id. at 625.
121. Id. at 631-32.
122. Id. at 635.
123. Id.
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that refers to homosexuals as a class, its more important point is that
legislation that declares gays unequal to others is improper and in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.' 24 Profes-
sor Karst wrote of Romer:
Unquestionably, Romer stands as an official expression, at the high-
est level, that antigay sentiment is an unacceptable basis for govern-
mental action. That interpretation of the Constitution is no little
achievement-given that some Americans continue to loathe the idea
of homosexuality, equating it with such evils as predatory
pedophilia. 1
25
Romer was only the first step in the march toward equality for gays
and lesbians. In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court gave equality advocates
for gays their greatest victory thus far. In Lawrence, the plaintiffs were
convicted of violating a Texas statute prohibiting "deviate sexual inter-
course" between individuals of the same sex. 126 They challenged the law
as violating their Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion rights.' 27 The Court overruled Bowers, reaffirming not only the
equal-protection guarantees for gays, but also the substantive due pro-
cess protections as well.
1 28
Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court gives broad protection to
Americans who are also gay. He wrote,
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions
into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is not
omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our lives and
existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a domi-
nant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty
presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought,
belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.1
29
After describing the liberty interests at stake, Justice Kennedy
framed the legal issue: "the validity of a Texas statute making it a crime
for two people of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual con-
duct."' 3 ° To resolve it, the Court deemed it necessary to reconsider its
holding in Bowers. 3 ' Kennedy concluded that several factors cast Bow-
ers's holding in significant doubt. First, he noted that the Court had not
124. Id. at 635-36.
125. Kenneth L. Karst, Constitutional Equality as a Cultural Form: The Courts and the
Meanings of Sex and Gender, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 513, 551 (2003).
126. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 563 (2003).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 578.
129. Id. at 562.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 564.
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fully appreciated the extent of the liberty interest at stake. 132 Lawrence
makes clear what Bowers did not:
It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon
this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private
lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality
finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the
conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more
enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosex-
ual persons the right to make this choice.' 3 3
Kennedy next noted that the Court was wrong when it declared that
proscriptions against consensual sodomy had ancient roots.' 34 Instead,
the Court found that such laws were not directed at homosexuals, but
rather at specific "non-procreative sexual activity more generally."' 35
And states that adopted these general laws avoided their import by refus-
ing to apply them against acts by consenting adults in private.' 36 Ken-
nedy noted that it was not until the 1970s that a few states singled out
same-sex relations for criminal prosecutions.
37
Third, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that some members of the
Court and many Americans generally condemn homosexual conduct as
immoral based on their own private religious beliefs, notions of what is
right or wrong behavior, and their views about the traditional family. 38
But the question is "whether the majority may use the power of the State
to enforce these views on the whole society through operation of the
criminal law."'139 And Kennedy warned, "Our obligation is to define the
liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code."' 4 °
Fourth, Kennedy summarized national and international legal
trends away from criminalizing sexual activity between consenting
adults acting in private.' 4 '
Then Kennedy wrote, "When sexuality finds overt expression in
intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one ele-
ment in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by
the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this
choice. ' i42 The Court then quoted Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
132. Id. at 567.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 567-68.
135. Id. at 568.
136. Id. at 569.
137. Id. at 570.
138. Id. at 571.
139. Id.
140. Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)).
141. Id. at 571-73.
142. Id. at 567.
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Pennsylvania v. Casey:
"These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to per-
sonal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right
to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under compulsion of the State."
Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for
these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.
14 3
Justice Kennedy concluded by saying, Bowers should be over-
ruled," and that Justice Stevens' dissent in Bowers stated the proper
analysis and should have controlled there, and should control in Law-
rence.145 He then wrote,
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons
who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships
where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public
conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government
must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual
persons seek to enter. The case does involve two adults who, with full
and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices
common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to
respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their exis-
tence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct
a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives
them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of
the government. "It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a
realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter."'
4 6
After laying out its findings, the Court finally announced, "Bowers was
not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not
to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is
overruled."' 1 47 The Court went on to hold that "[the petitioners'] right to
143. Id. at 574 (citation omitted) (quoting Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 851).
144. Id. at 578.
145. Id. Justice Stevens had relied on two propositions.
First, the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a
particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
prohibiting the practice . . . .Second, individual decisions by married persons,
concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship, even when not intended to
produce offspring, are a form of 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).




liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage
in their conduct without intervention of the government" and declared
the law unconstitutional.
14 8
Justice Scalia, in his Lawrence dissent, makes as strong a case for
same-sex marriage rights as does the majority. Justice Scalia notes that,
if moral condemnation of homosexual conduct is not a legitimate state
interest,
what justification could there possibly be for denying the benefits of
marriage to homosexual couples exercising "[t]he liberty protected by
the Constitution?" Surely not the encouragement of procreation, since
the sterile and the elderly are allowed to marry.
14 9
Justice Scalia, with this argument, exposed the shaky Constitutional
grounds upon which opponents of same-sex marriage stand. Justice
Scalia was admitting that, if moral disapproval were taken out of the
equation, homosexuals would be entitled to the same rights as heterosex-
uals under the Constitution. As past opinions involving controversial
topics such as abortion, pornography, and profanity have shown, moral
disapproval is not enough to deny a group of individuals the opportunity
to carry out a constitutionally protected right.
Given that Bowers, where the Court had declared that there was no
privacy right to sodomy, was overturned, it is worth asking what other
rights for same-sex couples might be protected under the right to pri-
vacy. Lawrence would certainly seem to stand for the premise that
homosexuals and heterosexuals share the same privacy rights. Laurence
Tribe wrote that "the evil targeted by the Court in Lawrence wasn't
criminal prosecution and punishment of same-sex sodomy, but the disre-
spect for those the Court identified as 'homosexuals' that labeling such
conduct as criminal helped to excuse."50
In Zablocki, the Court noted that the Wisconsin legislation would
have had the effect of creating more out-of-wedlock children.' 5 ' Consid-
ering that the prohibition on gay marriage causes many children to be
raised by unmarried couples, this observation appears to ring true in the
case of same-sex marriage as well. Facts such as this one expose the
fallacy of the argument advocating the prohibition of same-sex marriage
for the sake of children. Courts and legislatures, with a few notable
exceptions, have shown little problem letting gay couples adopt chil-
148. Id.
149. Id. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citation omitted); see also
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the Constitution of Disgust and
Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1046-47 (2005) (discussing Scalia's Lawrence dissent).
150. Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" that Dare Not Speak
Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1893, 1948 (2004).
151. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 390 (1978).
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dren, only objecting when the couple seeks to cement their relationship.
What could benefit children more than a stable home? Yet laws prohibit-
ing same-sex marriage continue to place families in a state of flux where
benefits, visitation rights, and other family protections are concerned.
In less than twenty years, the Court has come a long way toward
granting equality regardless of sexual orientation. There are still obsta-
cles to overcome, however. Though the Supreme Court in Romer used
the Equal Protection Clause to strike down legislation that discriminated
against gays and lesbians,' 52 the Court did not rule that gays were a
suspect class. As a result, legislation affecting gays is analyzed using a
rational-relation test under the Equal Protection Clause.
Just as the Court struggled with other discriminatory classifications
in the past, it now must resolve the legal status of gays under the Consti-
tution. 153 And surely Professor Karst is correct when he writes, "[L]aw
can (and does) both express and reinforce the status ordering of social
groups-or, as the civil-rights movement illustrates, law can contribute
to a status reordering."
1 54
I had assumed that the law of privacy and marriage as fundamental
rights were anathematic and have long ago believed that restrictions on
same-sex marriage are antithetical to equality. And when these funda-
mental rights are read alongside the fundamental freedom of association,
it seems inescapable that same-sex-marriage rights should enjoy com-
plete constitutional protection.
IV. MARRIAGE AS AN INTIMATE ASSOCIATION
Though the freedom of intimate association has been recognized by
the Court as a constitutionally protected right for more than twenty
years, the Court has never taken the time to explain where this right
comes from. Professor Karst defined an intimate association as "a close
and familiar personal relationship with another that is in some signifi-
cant way comparable to a marriage or family relationship."' 55 He wrote
that "the constitutional freedom of intimate association ... serves as an
organizing principle in a number of associational contexts by promoting
awareness of the importance of those values to the development of a
sense of individuality,"' 56 and that the freedom was "presumptive rather
than absolute" and did not "imply that the state is wholly disabled from
152. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-32 (1996).
153. See Brenda Feigen, Same-Sex Marriage: An Issue of Constitutional Rights Not Moral
Opinions, 27 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 345, 345-46 (2004).
154. Karst, supra note 125, at 545.
155. Karst, supra note 7, at 629.
156. Id. at 626 (footnote omitted).
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promoting majoritarian views of morality."1 57
What the freedom does demand is a serious search for justifications
by the state for any significant impairment of the values of intimate
association. And, like the First Amendment, which is one of its doc-
trinal underpinnings, it rejects as illegitimate any asserted justifica-
tion for repression of expressive conduct based on the risk that a
competing moral view will come to be accepted.
15 8
For Karst, "[t]he one most clearly established feature of the consti-
tutional freedom of intimate association is the freedom to marry, which
radically restricts the state's power to withhold the status of marriage
from a willing couple." 159 In determining what interests the state has in
restricting marriage, Karst wrote,
[T]here are occasions when the state may properly attach legal conse-
quences to someone's choice to enter or refrain from entering such a
status. Both sets of occasions are identifiable not by mechanical
application of definitions of status, but by careful weighing of the
associational values at stake in particular types of cases against the
justifications asserted for their restriction.'
60
Again, Karst elaborated on the balancing between individual and state:
The freedom of intimate association is unquestionably a "liberty"
interest, and the claimant is thus entitled to procedural due process
whether or not the benefit at stake is a "property" interest. Further-
more, when the courts do their substantive interest balancing in such
cases, whether or not they explain that operation in terms of a partic-
ular standard of review, they should weigh the associational interests
on the claimant's side of the balance, and not merely the material
benefit he or she is claiming.1
6 1
Karst believed intimate association did not come from the Due Pro-
cess Clause alone:
Some of the values in intimate association are closely bound up with
a person's sense of self: caring, commitment, intimacy, self-identifi-
cation. When the state seriously impairs those values by restricting
intimate association, the equal protection clause is at its most
demanding, insisting on justifications of the highest order if the state
is to be allowed to persist. The equal citizenship principle serves in
the context of intimate association as it serves elsewhere, not as a
result-producing formula but as a substantive guide to the interest
balancing that the Supreme Court has recently practiced in the name
157. Id. at 627.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 652.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 659 (footnotes omitted).
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of a variable standard of review.' 62
Karst mentioned same-sex marriage as a specific example of an equal-
protection intimate-association issue and framed the proper analysis:
Which of the values of intimate association are impaired? Does the
formal status in question have importance as a symbol, or as a key to
some benefit, or both? Does the impairment of associational values
imply some serious invasion of the equal citizenship interests of
respect, responsibility, and participation? If so, has the state suffi-
ciently justified that invasion?
163
Four years after their publication, Karst's ideas became law. In
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, a female challenged her exclusion
from membership as a violation of Minnesota's public-accommodation
statute, which made it unlawful to "deny any person the full and equal
enjoyment of . . . a place of public accommodation because of . . .
sex."' 164 In response, the Jaycees asserted that the state law violated its
right to freedom of association.'
65
Justice Brennan wrote that the freedom of association was a "fun-
damental element of personal liberty."' 166 Justice Brennan broke the free-
dom of association into two categories: expressive association and
intimate association. 167 Examples of protected acts of intimate associa-
tion included: marriage; childbirth; "the raising and education of chil-
dren"; and "cohabitation with one's relatives." '168
Justice Brennan stated that relationships of a smaller, more special-
ized nature would be encompassed by this protection, while more imper-
sonal groups, like corporations, would be less likely to be protected. 169
Justice Brennan explained that,
[b]etween these poles, of course, lies a broad range of human rela-
tionships that may make greater or lesser claims to constitutional pro-
tection from particular incursions by the State. Determining the limits
of state authority over an individual's freedom to enter into a particu-
lar association therefore unavoidably entails a careful assessment of
where that relationship's objective characteristics locate it on a spec-
trum from the most intimate to the most attenuated of personal
attachments. 170
Included as factors aiding in deciding where in the spectrum a particular
162. Id. at 663.
163. Id.
164. 468 U.S. 609, 615 (1984) (quoting MINN.STAT. § 363.03(3) (1982)).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 618.
167. Id. at 617-18.
168. Id. at 619.
169. Id. at 619-20.
170. Id. at 620.
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association fell were the following: "size, purpose, policies, selectivity,
congeniality, and other characteristics that in a particular case may be
pertinent."'' Nowhere in the opinion did Justice Brennan explain where
in the Constitution the right to intimate association came from. It is
important to note though that the Court, when citing examples of pro-
tected intimate association, points to a series of cases decided under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 72 In Roberts, Jus-
tice Brennan held that the Jaycees were not entitled to protection under
intimate association, because they are a "large and basically unselective"
group. 173
The Court has addressed intimate association three times since the
Roberts case. 174 In Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary
Club of Duarte, the dispute arose when the International Rotary Club
revoked a local chapter's charter for allowing women membership in
accordance with California's antidiscrimination statute. 1
75 The Court
held that the Rotary Club could not find refuge for its discriminatory
actions under a theory of freedom of association and was not the type of
organization protected under the theory of intimate association.
176
The Court did recognize that "the freedom to enter into and carry
on certain intimate or private relationships is a fundamental element of
liberty protected by the Bill of Rights."' 177 Moreover, the Court had in
mind a particular type of relationship: one which "presuppose[s] 'deep
attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals
with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, exper-
iences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one's
life.' ,,178 In making its determination, the Court considered the size, pur-
pose, selectivity, and exclusivity of Rotary, concluding the club was not
an intimate association, but rather a club that keeps its "windows and
doors open to the whole world."'
179
The Court addressed intimate association for the second time in
1989, in City of Dallas v. Stanglin.'8 ° Chief Justice Rehnquist, while
171. Id.
172. See id. at 619 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1978); Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 503-04 (1977) (plurality opinion); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)).
173. Id. at 621.
174. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 236-37 (1990); City of Dallas v.
Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 23-25 (1989); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481
U.S. 537, 544-46 (1987).
175. 481 U.S. at 541.
176. Id. at 546.
177. Id. at 545.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 547.
180. 490 U.S. 19 (1989).
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holding that the right to intimate association was not violated when the
City of Dallas required that dance halls for teenagers could only serve
those between the ages of fourteen and eighteen, found the right to asso-
ciation to be governed by the First Amendment.' 8 ' Rehnquist noted that
the right of patrons to mingle with those of a different age group was not
one of the "intimate human relationships" discussed in Roberts.'8 2
In FW/PBS, Inc., v. City of Dallas, Justice O'Connor held that
motel owners' freedom of intimate association was not violated by a
statute forbidding rentals of ten hours or less.183 Justice O'Connor based
her decision on the idea of intimate association protecting "traditional
personal bonds" as discussed in Roberts.'84 It is important to note that
though Justice Brennan does speak of traditions after mentioning exam-
ples of protected activities, he never placed the label "traditional per-
sonal bonds" on these acts, rather referring to them only as "personal
bonds."' 85 This distinction is interesting because, when the word "tradi-
tional" is invoked, courts are more likely to look at a society's history as
opposed to fundamental rights for guidance.1 86
An expressive association case that briefly addressed the scope of
intimate association was Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, where Chief
Justice Rehnquist held that requiring the Boy Scouts, a private organiza-
tion, to allow a gay scoutmaster violated their freedom of intimate asso-
ciation under the First Amendment. 87 The Chief Justice cited Roberts,
where Justice Brennan wrote that "implicit in the right to engage in
activities protected by the First Amendment is a corresponding right to
associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social,
economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends."' 88 The Chief Jus-
tice noted that this protection was in place to keep the majority from
imposing its beliefs "on groups that would rather express other, perhaps
unpopular, ideas."' 89 The Chief Justice went on to write that "[f]orcing a
group to accept certain members may impair the ability of the group to
express those views, and only those views, that it intends to express."' 90
In his dissent, Justice Stevens addressed the merits of a claim by the Boy
Scouts that their right to exclude was also protected by intimate
association:
181. Id. at 23-25, 28.
182. Id. at 24.
183. 493 U.S. 215, 236-37 (1990).
184. Id. at 237.
185. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
186. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-94 (1986).
187. 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000).
188. Id. at 647 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622).
189. Id. at 647-48.
190. Id. at 648.
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Our cases recognize a substantive due process right "to enter into and
carry on certain intimate or private relationships." As with the First
Amendment right to associate, the State may not interfere with the
selection of individuals in such relationships. Though the precise
scope of the right to intimate association is unclear, "we consider
factors such as size, purpose, selectivity, and whether others are
excluded from critical aspects of the relationship" to determine
whether a group is sufficiently personal to warrant this type of consti-
tutional protection. Considering BSA's size, its broad purposes, and
its nonselectivity, it is impossible to conclude that being a member of
the Boy Scouts ranks among those intimate relationships falling
within this right, such as marriage, bearing children, rearing children,
and cohabitation with relatives.'
9'
It is important to note that Stevens once again cited marriage as an
example of a protected intimate association. There is arguably no more
personal a relationship than that between a couple who wants to marry.
Justice Stevens also mentioned the right to intimate association in his
Troxel v. Granville dissent:
But the instinct against overregularizing decisions about personal
relations is sustained on firmer ground than mere tradition. It flows in
equal part from the premise that people and their intimate associa-
tions are complex and particular, and imposing a rigid template upon
them all risks severing bonds our society would do well to
preserve. '
92
The four Supreme Court cases addressing intimate association pro-
vide surprisingly little guidance into the right. Though intimate associa-
tion was addressed four times in a period of less than ten years, the
actual discussion of the contours of intimate association only fills half a
dozen pages or so combined. The lower courts have thus been left to
struggle with the boundaries of this right, and subsequently have devel-
oped widely disparate views on the matter.'
93
One of the most interesting recent intimate-association disputes was
the Eleventh Circuit case Shahar v. Bowers.t 9 4 Robin Shahar accepted a
job at the Georgia Department of Law after graduating from Emory Law
191. Id. at 698 n.26 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary
Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545-46 (1987)).
192. 530 U.S. 57, 91 n.10 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Carr, 101 F.3d 1117, 1118 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that school's
anti-nepotism policy affected the associational right of marriage, but using rational-basis review to
uphold the regulation), McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558, 1563, 1574 (11 th Cir. 1994) (holding
that secretary has no intimate association claim where she is transferred because she marries
another officer), Trujillo v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 768 F.2d 1186, 1189-90 (10th Cir. 1985)
(holding that right to intimate association is protected under substantive due process).
194. 70 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 1995), rev'd en banc, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997); see also
Cornelia Sage Russell, Comment, Shahar v. Bowers: Intimate Association and the First
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School. 195 When her boss, Attorney General Michael Bowers, discov-
ered that Shahar was a lesbian and planning a wedding with her partner,
he withdrew her job offer. 9 6 Shahar sued, and a three-judge panel of the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that Shahar's relationship was
a protected intimate association, and that the government would have to
overcome a strict-scrutiny standard of review since burdens on civil
marriage are usually judged with a strict-scrutiny standard. 197 The Elev-
enth Circuit granted Attorney General Bowers a rehearing en banc and
this time ruled against Shahar. 9' The court held that the right of inti-
mate association was a First Amendment right, and that the appropriate
standard of review was the Pickering balancing test-which is used in
cases where a public employee has been punished because she exercised
free speech rights and which balances the interests of the speaker and the
state-and ruled that the government's interests outweighed Shahar's. 199
Many thought that the Supreme Court would grant certiorari to resolve
the lower court split over the nature and extent of intimate association,
but the Court declined to accept the case. 2° Nonetheless, the Eleventh
Circuit panel's initial decision marked a step forward for advocates of
same-sex marriage rights.
More recently, in Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, a
Nebraska constitutional amendment was challenged by civil-liberties
organizations as being unconstitutional."' ° The amendment declared that
"[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman shall be valid or recog-
nized in Nebraska. The uniting of two persons of the same sex in a civil
union, domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship shall
not be valid or recognized in Nebraska. 2 °2 The Federal District Court
held that the amendment violated the plaintiff group's right to intimate
association and declared this right to come from the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 0 3 The District Court
quoted the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens Against Rent Control!
Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, which stated that "[t]he
voters may no more violate the Constitution by enacting a ballot mea-
Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1479, 1517-27 (1996) (analyzing Shahar as it applies to the right to
intimate association and same-sex relationships).
195. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1100; Russell, supra note 194, at 1517.
196. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1101.
197. Shahar, 70 F.3d at 1226.
198. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1110-11.
199. Id. at 1102 n.9, 1103, 1110.
200. See Shahar v. Bowers, 522 U.S. 1049 (1998) denying cert. to 114 F.3d 1097.
201. 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 985 (D. Neb. 2005), rev'd, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006).
202. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29.
203. Citizens for Equal Prot., 368 F. Supp. 2d at 989.
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sure than a legislative body may do so by enacting legislation. ' '2 ' The
court noted that the amendment "potentially prohibits or at least inhibits
people, regardless of sexual preference, from entering into numerous
relationships or living arrangements that could be interpreted as a same-
sex relationship 'similar to' marriage. '"205 The court went on to argue
that "[a]mong the threatened relationships would be those of roommates,
co-tenants, foster parents, and related people who share living arrange-
ments, expenses, custody of children, or ownership of property."2 °6 The
court concluded this line of reasoning by stating that, if the Roberts
spectrum test was applied, these relationships would fall "closer to the
end of the continuum that deserve[s] Constitutional protection."2 7
The Bruning victory would be short-lived. The United States
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's ruling in July
of 2006.208 The court used the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to support its decision to overturn the lower court, only
briefly addressed the association question, and noted that the amendment
did not directly or substantially interfere with the ability to associate.20 9
The district court's opinion in Bruning shows that there is a seg-
ment in the judicial community, whatever its size may be, that believes
that the freedom of intimate association protects same-sex relationships.
Given the inevitability of a same-sex-marriage case reaching the
Supreme Court, it is reasonable to expect that the intimate association
argument is one that the Court will face.
Though the lower courts are split on the origins of the right of inti-
mate association, and the Supreme Court has chosen not to elaborate on
the nature of the protected relationships in the past fifteen years, there is
nevertheless no dispute as to the existence of a right of intimate associa-
tion. A same-sex-marriage case might provide the Court with the perfect
opportunity to define once and for all the extent of this right.
V. CONCLUSION
To paraphrase Justice Kennedy:
Same-sex-marriage cases will rarely involve minors. They do not
involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated
in relationships where consent might easily be refused. Same-sex
marriage does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does
204. Id. at 990 (alteration in original) (quoting Citizens Against Rent Control/Coal. for Fair
Hous. v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981)).
205. Id. at 995.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 996.
208. Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 863 (8th Cir. 2006).
209. Id. at 866, 870.
20081
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
involve whether the government must give formal recognition to
marital a relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter. Same-
sex marriage does involve two adults who, with the full and mutual
consent from each other, commit themselves to each other. Same-sex
couples are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot
demean their existence or control their destiny by demeaning them
and their marriages. Their right to liberty under the Due Process
Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without
intervention of the government. It is a promise of the Constitution
that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may
not enter.2 1°
I have argued for a broad freedom of intimate association, an interpreta-
tion of the fundamental constitutional guarantee that protects all of the
fundamental rights of American citizens who are also gay. This interpre-
tation is flatly inconsistent with legislative trends across the United
States. Nonetheless, I remain convinced that bans on gay marriage are
unconstitutional on several grounds. First, they burden the fundamental
right to marry. Second, they impermissibly intrude on constitutional pri-
vacy. And, perhaps most importantly, they impede the freedom of inti-
mate association. Each ground alone should be sufficient to turn back
same-sex-marriage bans. But I am arguing that taken together, the col-
lective constitutional violations render such bans presumptively invalid
and subject to the highest judicial scrutiny.
Herein, I have argued that the ultimate personal liberty, protected
by due process and equality guarantees, is the freedom to form intimate
associations without interference by the government. Justice Kennedy
has marked a pathway by writing: "It is a promise of the Constitution
that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not
enter. ' '21 1 The question remains whether the Roberts Court will follow it.
Both Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justice Samuel
Alito were asked during their confirmation hearings if they believed the
Constitution protects the right to privacy. Both answered affirmatively,
but neither indicated that he supported a broad freedom of intimate asso-
ciation.212 If one assumes that Roberts and Alito will not endorse a
broad right of privacy, there is still Justice Kennedy, in the middle of a
sharply divided Court, holding the constitutional meaning of liberty in
his hands.
210. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
211. Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992)).
212. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. To Be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 318, 400 (2006) (testimony of Samuel A. Alito, Jr.); Confirmation Hearing on the
Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 146-47 (2005) (testimony of John G. Roberts, Jr.).
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In brief, my argument is that the barest majority of the Supreme
Court appears prepared to defend these fundamental rights and not to
reify outdated theories of substantive due process or equal protection
that have been repudiated during the past fifty years.2t3 It also appears
that some members of the Court remain willing to tell some American
citizens they must wait for their day in Court and for their due process or
equal justice before the law.
The Court should not abdicate its duty to declare what the law is. It
should lead, explaining to the nation that American citizens who are also
gay, individually and as couples and/or families, enjoy broad federal
constitutional protection over matters as fundamental as the freedom of
intimate association and the right to marry.
I agree with Mohr, Karst, and others who have written forcefully
that "legal bars to same-sex marriage are profoundly unjust. '' 214 It is
time for the Court to dismantle all discriminations against gays, and the
place to begin is with the invalidation of laws proscribing same-sex
marriage.
213. "The State finds support for its 'equal application' theory in the decision of the Court in
[the 1883 case of] Pace v. Alabama." Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967) (citation omitted)
(citing Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883)).
214. MOHR, supra note 5, at 10.
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